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Abstract The goal of this paper is to provide a global account of universal Free
Choice (FC) inferences (argued to be needed in Chemla 2009b). We propose
a stronger exhaustivity operator than proposed in Fox (2007), one that doesn’t
only negate all the Innocently Excludable (IE) alternatives but also asserts all
the “Innocently Includable” (II) ones, and subsequently can derive universal FC
inferences globally. We further show that Innocent Inclusion is independently
motivated by considerations that come from the semantics of only (data from Alxatib
2014). Finally, the distinction between Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion
allows us to capture differences between FC inferences and other scalar implicatures.
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1 The problem of Universal Free Choice
1.1 Free Choice as an implicature
As is well known, a sentence like (1) where an existential modal takes scope above
or gives rise to the Free Choice (FC) inferences (1a)-(1b) (Kamp 1974). It is also
well known that those inferences don’t follow from standard assumptions about
the semantics of allowed and or: ♦(a∨b) is equivalent to ♦a∨♦b rather than the
observed FC inference ♦a∧♦b.
(1) Mary is allowed to eat ice cream or cake. ♦(a∨b)⇔ (♦a∨♦b)
a.  Mary is allowed to eat ice cream. ♦a
b.  Mary is allowed to eat cake. ♦b
Alonso-Ovalle (2005), following Kratzer & Shimoyama (2002), argues further
that the Free Choice inference from (1) to (1a)-(1b) should be treated as a scalar
implicature, due to its disappearance under negation, as in (2).1
* We thank Chris Barker, Brian Buccola, Luka Crnicˇ, Andreas Haida, Roni Katzir, William Starr, the
audiences at SALT 27 and at the MIT Workshop on Exhaustivity 2016 for helpful discussions and
comments. All mistakes and shortcomings are our own.
1 For reasons of space we do not provide here further arguments in favor of an implicature-based
account of Free Choice, but simply assume that such an account is needed. We argue elsewhere
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(2) John isn’t allowed to eat ice cream or cake ¬♦(a∨b)
a. 6≈ It’s not the case that John is both allowed to eat ice cream and allowed
to eat cake (but maybe he’s allowed one of them). ¬(♦a∧♦b)
b. ≈ It’s not the case that John is allowed to eat ice cream and it’s not the
case that he is allowed to eat cake. ¬♦(a∨b)
Implicature-based accounts of FC (Fox 2007; Chemla 2009a; Franke 2011) maintain
that allowed and or have a standard semantics, such that the basic meaning of (1) can
be stated as ♦(a∨b) using a standard modal logic. The FC inferences are derived
by enriching the meaning to derive the FC inference ♦a∧♦b using mechanisms that
are independently needed in order to derive scalar implicatures.
1.2 Universal Free Choice: An argument for embedded implicatures?
Our main focus in this paper is universal FC inferences, exemplified in (3). Chemla
(2009b) provides evidence that, when embedded under universal quantification as
in (3), the embedded FC inferences in (3a)-(3b) are as robust as in the unembedded
case of (1).
(3) Every boy is allowed to eat ice cream or cake. ∀x♦(Px∨Qx)
a.  Every boy is allowed to eat ice cream. ∀x♦Px
b.  Every boy is allowed to eat cake. ∀x♦Qx
A prima facie plausible analysis of the inferences in (3) may be based on a local
derivation of FC: every boy takes scope over an enriched FC meaning, with whatever
mechanism we might have for enriching (1) applying in the scope of every boy (see
Singh, Wexler, Astle-Rahim, Kamawar & Fox 2016 for a possible explanation for
the relative robustness of this putative local implicature).
As Chemla (2009b) points out, a local derivation is in fact the only way standard
implicature-based accounts can derive universal FC (see §2 and in particular fn. 9
for the results of applying Fox’s mechanism globally). In this light, (3) may just
seem like yet another argument in favor of deriving implicatures at an embedded
level (Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012).
(drive.google.com/file/d/0B6BSDIYuatIpLWtjS1lNYmhhWHc) that by forcing semantic identity
between (1) and (2) using VP ellipsis we can rule out accounts which rely on ambiguity such as
Aloni (2007). As William Starr has pointed out to us, this argument doesn’t carry over (at least not
straightforwardly) to other accounts with a non-standard semantics which don’t rely on ambiguity
(see Starr 2016 and references therein). We hope to have a more thorough discussion of accounts of
FC that assume a non-standard semantics for or or allowed in future work.
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1.3 Negative universal Free Choice as an argument for a global derivation
However, as Chemla (2009b) notes, a local derivation cannot explain a very similar
universal inference that arises in the negative case in (4):2
(4) No student is required to solve both problem A and problem B.
¬∃x(Px∧Qx)⇔∀x♦(¬Px∨¬Qx)
a.  No student is required to solve problem A. ¬∃xPx⇔∀x♦¬Px
b.  No student is required to solve problem B. ¬∃xQx⇔∀x♦¬Qx
Semantically, the inferences from (4) to (4a)-(4b) completely parallel the universal
FC inferences in (3). As the formulas on the right indicate, the inference can be
restated as a universal FC inference: from every student is allowed not to solve
problem A or not to solve problem B (=(4)) to every student is allowed not to solve
problem A (=(4a)) and every student is allowed not to solve problem B (=(4b)).
An account of (4) along the lines of (3) is thus needed. However, a local
derivation is not applicable in this case: such a derivation would require an embedded
syntactic position at which the enriched FC meaning can be derived. However, no
such position exists in (4). Since the scope of no student only contains strong scalar
items—required and and—no further strengthening can occur at any embedded
position.
Because the inferences cannot be derived from embedding the mechanism we
have for (1), they must be derived at the matrix level, above negation, namely they
necessitate a global derivation. Given the parallelism between (3) and (4), a global
account of the positive case in (3) should be applicable to the negative case in (4) as
well. We set our goal then to provide a global account of universal FC.
1.4 Interim summary
What we need is an account which satisfies the desiderata in (5).
(5) Desiderata: Provide an account of Free Choice which
a. treats it as an implicature, and
b. can provide a global derivation for universal Free Choice.
To our knowledge, no existing account provides a principled analysis that satisfies
these goals.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In §2 we build on Fox’s
(2007) analysis, which meets the requirement in (5a) but fails to meet (5b), and
2 Chemla’s (2009b) results show a significant difference in robustness between the universal FC
inferences in (3) and (4). We will not attempt to explain this difference.
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modify it in order to meet (5b) by introducing the notion of Innocent Inclusion on
top of Fox’s notion of Innocent Exclusion. In §3 we provide further motivation
for Innocent Inclusion from the presupposition of only. In §4 we show that the
distinction between Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion allows us to capture
differences between FC inferences and other scalar implicatures.
2 Proposal
2.1 Disjunction and its alternatives
A key point in analyzing FC disjunction is understanding the distinction between (6)
and (7). While from simple disjunction we infer the exclusive inference in (6a), for
Free Choice disjunction we infer what we might call the opposite inference in (7a),
namely FC.
(6) Simple disjunction:
Mary ate ice cream or cake a∨b
a.  Mary didn’t eat both ice cream and cake. ¬(a∧b)
(7) Free Choice disjunction:
Mary is allowed to eat ice cream or cake. [=(1)] ♦(a∨b)
a.  Mary is allowed to eat ice cream and allowed to eat cake. ♦a∧♦b
Since we view both the exclusive inference in (6a) and the FC inference in (7a) as
implicatures, and since implicatures can only be determined after alternatives are
specified, we should first ask what alternatives we generate for those sentences.
Standardly, the following sets of alternatives are assumed: disjunction gives rise
to disjunctive alternatives, that is alternatives where we replace the disjunction with
the individual disjuncts (see, e.g., Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002; Sauerland 2004;
Katzir 2007); and to a conjunctive alternative—an alternative where we replace
disjunction with conjunction. When applied to the sentences in (6) and (7), we
generate the alternatives in (8a) and (8b), respectively.
(8) a. Set of alternatives for simple disjunction:
Alt(a∨b) = { a∨b︸︷︷︸
Prejacent
, a , b︸︷︷︸
Disjunctive alt.
, a∧b︸︷︷︸
Conjunctive alt.
}
b. Set of alternatives for Free Choice disjunction:
Alt(♦(a∨b)) = {♦(a∨b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prejacent
, ♦a , ♦b︸ ︷︷ ︸
Disjunctive alt.
, ♦(a∧b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Conjunctive alt.
}
Looking at those sets of alternatives in light of the inferences we get in (6) and (7),
we can see a striking difference between simple disjunction and FC disjunction with
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regard to the conjunction of their disjunctive alternatives:
(9) Observation:
a. From simple disjunction we infer that the conjunction of the disjunctive
alternatives (a∧b) is false.
b. From Free Choice disjunction we infer that the conjunction of the
disjunctive alternatives (♦a∧♦b) is true.
What distinguishes the two cases and yields the opposite results in (9)? Certain
analyses of Free Choice disjunction (Fox 2007; Chemla 2009a; Franke 2011) rely
on closure under conjunction as the distinguishing property: whereas Alt(a∨b) is
closed under conjunction, Alt(♦(a∨b)) is not.
Specifically, the crucial difference between the two sets is in (10):
(10) a. The conjunction of the disjunctive alternatives a and b, i.e., a∧b, is a
member of Alt(a∨b).
b. The conjunction of the disjunctive alternatives ♦a and ♦b, i.e., ♦a∧
♦b, is not a member of Alt(♦(a∨b)).
To see how this fact is responsible for the opposite results derived for the two cases,
let us focus on the account of FC in Fox (2007).
2.2 Towards an account: Innocent Exclusion
Within the grammatical theory, scalar implicatures are generated by applying a
covert exhaustivity operator, EXH, akin to overt only.
This operator takes a prejacent and a set of alternatives. What should it return as
an output? If we let EXH ‘blindly’ negate every alternative that is stronger than the
prejacent, we will sometimes derive contradictions, for example when exhaustifying
a∨ b with respect to Alt(a∨ b). Since both a and b are stronger than a∨ b, EXH
would negate them and yield the contradiction (a∨b)∧¬a∧¬b.
We must find a way to let EXH exclude as many alternatives as possible consis-
tently with the prejacent.
To achieve this, Fox (2007) argues in favor of using the notion of Innocent
Exclusion (inspired by Sauerland 2004).
(11) Innocent Exclusion procedure:
a. Take all maximal sets of alternatives that can be negated consistently
with the prejacent.
b. Only exclude (i.e., negate) those alternatives that are members in all
such sets—the Innocently Excludable (=IE) alternatives.
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Let us show now how Innocent Exclusion avoids contradiction when applied to a∨b
and to ♦(a∨b). To apply Innocent Exclusion to a∨b we first have to identify the
maximal sets of alternatives in Alt(a∨b) that can be negated consistently with the
prejacent. There are two such sets: {a,a∧b} and {b,a∧b}. The second step, by
the Innocent Exclusion procedure, is to exclude those alternatives which are in all
of those sets; there is only one such alternative, a∧ b, which is thus the only IE
alternative.
A parallel result is derived by applying Innocent Exclusion to ♦(a∨ b). The
maximal sets of alternatives in Alt(♦(a∨b)) that can be negated consistently with
the prejacent are {♦a,♦(a∧b)} and {♦b,♦(a∧b)}, and consequently the only IE
alternative is ♦(a∧b).
The result of Innocent Exclusion for the two cases is represented schematiclally
in figure 1.
a∨b a∧b
a
b
Simple disjunction
♦(a∨b) ♦(a∧b)
♦a
♦b
Free Choice disjunction
Figure 1 Results of Innocent Exclusion for simple and Free Choice disjunction.
The lines represent entailment relations from right to left, the prejacent
is marked with a rectangle and the IE alternatives with a circle.
At this level, for simple disjunction we derive that the prejacent a∨b is true and that
the conjunctive alternative a∧b is false, and similarly for Free Choice disjunction:
the prejacent ♦(a∨b) is true and the conjunctive alternative ♦(a∧b) is false.3 This
3 As has been claimed by Simons (2005), FC inferences are often not accompanied by the negation of
the conjunctive alternative ♦(a∧b). It is crucial to note that our derivation of FC in what follows
does not depend on deriving the negation of the conjunctive alternative (in fact it follows even if
the conjunctive alternative is omitted altogether from the set of alternatives). See §4, in which it
would become clear that the question of whether an IE alternative is negated depends on whether
it is relevant. Assuming that the only constraint on relevance is closure under Boolean operations
(conjunction and negation), it is possible for ♦a and ♦b to be relevant without ♦(a∧ b) being
relevant. A simplifying assumption in the discussion here and in what follows is that all alternatives
are relevant, but this should not be seen as an empirical claim that we always infer the negation of the
IE alternatives. See Fox & Katzir (2011); Singh et al. (2016) for relevant discussion.
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result gives us the first hint as to why we derive opposite results for the two cases:
Since Alt(a∨b) is closed under conjunction, the output of applying Innocent
Exclusion to a∨ b which ensures the falsity of a∧ b is not comaptible with both
disjunctive alternatives a and b being true. In contrast, since Alt(♦(a∨ b)) is not
closed under conjunction, the output of applying Innocent Exclusion to ♦(a∨ b)
which ensures the falsity of ♦(a∧b) is comaptible with both disjunctive alternatives
♦a and ♦b being true.
Note that FC is not yet derived for Free Choice disjunction. Given what we
have said so far we can only explain why it would be in principle possible to derive
a conjunctive meaning for Free Choice disjunction but not for simple disjunction:
such a meaning is consistent with the result of applying Innocent Exclusion in the
case of FC disjunction but not in the case of simple disjuntion. We still have to find
a way to actually derive the FC inferences.
The Innocent Exclusion procedure in (11) leads to the lexical entry for the
exhaustivity operator EXHIE in (12a): given a set of alternatives C and a prejacent p,
it would assert the prejacent and negate all the IE alternatives which are defined in
(12b).
(12) Innocent-Exclusion-based exhaustivity operator: (Fox 2007)
a. JEXHIEK(C)(p)(w)⇔ p(w)∧∀q ∈ IE(p,C)[¬q(w)]
b. IE(p,C) =
⋂{C′ ⊆C :C′ is a maximal subset of C, s.t.
{¬q : q ∈C′}∪{p} is consistent}
In the next section we introduce the notion of Innocent Inclusion, and suggest
a different lexical entry for EXH than (12a), one that implements both Innocent
Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion and can directly derive FC inferences.
2.3 Introducing Innocent Inclusion
How do we derive the Free Choice inferences for Free Choice disjunction? This is
where we depart from Fox (2007).
The FC inferences ♦a and ♦b are derived in Fox (2007) indirectly, by applying
EXHIE recursively. Our proposal is to define EXH differently from (12a), such that
those inferences would be derived directly, by letting EXH “include”, i.e., assert the
alternatives ♦a and ♦b.
We suggest that EXH has a dual role: it doesn’t only negate certain alternatives,
it also asserts some other alternatives. The empirical motivation for this move is
that it would allow us to derive universal FC globally, as we will show in §2.4. At
this point we would like to mention the underlying conception that has guided our
thinking, namely (13).
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(13) Possible underlying conception:
Exhaustifying p with respect to a set of alternativesC should get us as close
as possible to a cell in the partition induced by C.
Namely the goal of EXH is to assign a truth value to every alternative, thereby
yielding a cell in the partition the set of alternatives produces. In other words, EXH is
designed such that when possible it would yield the complete answer to the question
formed by the set of alternatives.
From this conception it follows that EXH shouldn’t only exclude as many al-
ternatives as possible, but also include, i.e., assert, as many alternatives as possible
once the exclusion is complete.
What are the alternatives we want EXH to include? One possibility we might en-
tertain is that EXH blindly includes all non-IE alternatives. But this would sometimes
lead to contradictions: exhaustifying a∨b with respect to Alt(a∨b) would yield a
contradiction, because including a and b, which are both non-IE, would contradict
the derived falsity of a∧b.
For the same reasons we needed Exclusion to apply innocently, namely avoiding
contradictions, we also need Inclusion to apply innocently. We thus suggest the
procedure of Innocent Inclusion in (14).
(14) Innocent Inclusion procedure:
a. Take all maximal sets of alternatives that can be asserted consistently
with the prejacent and the negation of all IE alternatives.
b. Only include (i.e., assert) those alternatives that are members in all
such sets—the Innocently Includable (=II) alternatives.
Note the similarity between Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion: Innocent
Inclusion is only different from Innocent Exclusion in two respects: (i) that we
include instead of exclude, and (ii) that we check for consistency not only with
respect to the prejacent but also with respect to the negation of all the IE alternatives.4
Let us see now how Innocent Inclusion applies to simple and Free Choice
disjunction to derive the desired results. Having Innocent Inclusion changes nothing
for simple disjunction: The only II alternative is the prejacent a∨b. This is since the
4 Why do we have to consider the set of IE alternatives for determining the set of II alternatives, and
not vice versa? Let us consider what would happen if we first considered what’s II: take for example
the sentence some boy came and its alternative every boy came. If we were to include first, we would
derive that the alternative every boy came is true. Namely exhaustifying over some boy came would
yield a meaning equivalent to every boy came. This would make for a very inefficient tool to use
in conversation: by choosing an utterance from the set of alternatives {some boy came, every boy
came} the speaker would only be able to convey one epistemic state she might be in (one cell in the
partition); she would not be able to convey an epistemic state in which some but not all boys came.
By prioritizing exclusion over inclusion we allow the speaker to convey more epistemic states.
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maximal sets of alternatives that are consistent with the truth of a∨b (the prejacent)
and the falsity of a∧b (the IE alternative) are {a∨b,a} and {a∨b,b}, and the only
member in their intersection is the prejacent a∨b.
For FC disjunction, on the other hand, we derive the desired FC inferences with
our procedure, since ♦a and ♦b are II. In this case, all the alternatives which are not
IE are together consistent with the truth of ♦(a∨b) (the prejacent) and the falsity of
♦(a∧b) (the IE alternative). That is, we only have one maximal set of alternatives
to consider, {♦(a∨b),♦a,♦b}, and all alternatives within this set are II. Therefore
applying Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion yields a cell in the partition (a
complete answer) in this case; the output tells us of every alternative whether it is
true or false.
The result of Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion for the two cases is
represented schematiclally in figure 2.
a∨b a∧b
a
b
Simple disjunction
♦(a∨b) ♦(a∧b)
♦a
♦b
Free Choice disjunction
Figure 2 Results of Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion for simple and
Free Choice disjunction. The II alternatives are marked with a wavy
circle.
We have seen that applying Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion yields the
desired results for simple and Free Choice disjunction: an exclusive or meaning
for simple disjunction and an FC meaning for Free Choice disjunction. For these
two cases, the results we derive are identical to those Fox (2007) derives with the
recursive application of EXHIE .
Before we move on to show that Innocent Inclusion allows us to derive universal
FC while a recursive application of EXHIE doesn’t, let us state the lexical entry of
the exhaustivity operator we are assuming here, EXHIE+II , which implements both
Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion. We first define the sets of IE and II
alternatives: the set of IE alternatives remains as in Fox (2007), and the set of II
alternatives is defined in parallel in (15b), with the two key differences between
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Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion discussed above.
(15) Given a sentence p and a set of alternatives C:
a. IE(p,C) =
⋂{C′ ⊆C :C′ is a maximal subset of C, s.t. [=(12b)]
{¬q : q ∈C′}∪{p} is consistent}
b. II(p,C) =
⋂{C′′ ⊆C :C′′ is a maximal subset of C, s.t.
{r : r ∈C′′}∪{p}∪{¬q : q ∈ IE(p,C)} is consistent}
With these definitions at hand we can write the lexical entry of EXHIE+II in (16):
Given a set of alternatives C and a prejacent p, it would negate all the IE alternatives
and assert all the II alternatives.5,6
(16) Innocent-Exclusion+Innocent-Inclusion-based exhaustivity operator:JEXHIE+IIK(C)(p)(w)⇔∀q ∈ IE(p,C)[¬q(w)]
∧∀r ∈ II(p,C)[r(w)]
2.4 Deriving universal Free Choice
As mentioned above, for both simple disjunction and Free Choice disjunction the
view promoted here yields the same result Fox (2007) derives by applying EXHIE
recursively. However, the current proposal and Fox (2007) make different predictions
5 As far as we can see, EXHIE+II is definable in terms of a recursive application of EXHIE , once we
assume that the only alternatives EXHIE projects are its sub-domain alternatives, i.e., alternatives
generated by replacing the set of alternatives EXH operates on with its subsets. Namely, (ia) yields
the same result as (ib) in all cases we checked.
(i) a. EXHIEC′ [EXH
IE
C p] (where C
′ = {EXHIEC′′(p) :C′′ ⊆C})
b. EXHIE+IIC p
We will not attempt to prove that (ia) and (ib) are equivalent at this point though, neither are we
going to claim for the superiority of any of these versions. Note, however, that our proposal in §3 for
the semantics of only and the different treatment we give for IE and II alternatives in §4 crucially
rely on the distinction between IE and II alternatives, namely on the version with EXHIE+II in (ib).
Furthermore, distributive inferences for sentences of the form ∀x(Px∨Qx) (see fn. 7) can be derived
with recursive application of EXHIE+II using Fox’s assumptions about how alternatives project;
recursive application of EXHIE with the assumption about projection in (ia) won’t do in this case.
6 Note that p (the prejacent) can never be in IE(p,C) and it will always be in II(p,C) (assuming that
the prejacent p must be in C, and that C is finite). Namely, p(w) in (i) is redundant since it is entailed
by ∀r ∈ II(p,C)[r(w)]. So (i) is equivalent to (16), where p(w) is taken out. We set aside for now the
consequences for infinite sets of alternatives.
(i) JEXHIE+IIK(C)(p)(w)⇔ p(w)∧∀q ∈ IE(p,C)[¬q(w)]∧∀r ∈ II(p,C)[r(w)]
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regarding universal FC, to which we now turn.
Consider the set of alternatives we generate for (3), in (18). We assume that
alternatives where the universal quantifier every is replaced with the existential one
some are generated, and thus the set of alternatives is multiplied by 2 compared to
the 4 alternatives of unembedded Free Choice disjunction; we end up with the 8
alternatives in (18).7
(17) Every boy is allowed to eat ice cream or cake. [=(3)] ∀x♦(Px∨Qx)
(18) Set of alternatives for universal Free Choice:
Alt(∀x♦(Px∨Qx))= {∀x♦(Px∨Qx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Prejacent
, ∀x♦Px , ∀x♦Qx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Universal-disjunctive alt.
, ∀x♦(Px∧Qx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Universal-conjunctive alt.
,
∃x♦(Px∨Qx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Existential alt.
, ∃x♦Px , ∃x♦Qx︸ ︷︷ ︸
Existential-disjunctive alt.
, ∃x♦(Px∧Qx)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Existential-conjunctive alt.
}
The universal FC inference follows straightforwardly with one application of EXHIE+II ,
7 We assume that deriving weaker alternatives is possible, contra Fox (2007: fn. 35), and therefore
alternatives where every is replaced with some are generated. The reason for this assumption is
that otherwise we would in fact predict the opposite of what we want: If every generated no some-
alternatives, the application of EXHIE+II would lead to the negation of ∀x♦Px and of ∀x♦Qx. This
bad result is avoided by dispensing with the stipulation in Fox (2007: fn. 35).
See Bar-Lev & Fox (2016); Gotzner & Romoli (2017) for why this stipulation isn’t needed
to begin with: the original motivation for it was to derive for every boy ate ice cream or cake the
distributive inferences that some boy ate ice cream and some boy ate cake. But given that EXHIE
can apply recursively those inferences are derived, and furthermore the negated inferences that not
every boy ate ice cream and not every boy ate cake are not derived, a result which has been argued by
Crnicˇ, Chemla & Fox (2015) to be desired. Our proposal here is compatible with this view: in this
case recursive application of EXHIE+II yields the same result as recursive application of EXHIE .
The assumption that weaker alternatives are generated is relevant also for a problem discussed in
Nouwen (2017). Nouwen’s concern is with deriving FC for sentences where an existential modal
takes scope above a universal quantifier which in turn takes scope above disjunction, namely sentences
of the form ♦∀x(Px∨Qx). He claims that Fox (2007) incorrectly predicts the disjunctive alternatives
♦∀xPx and ♦∀xQx to be IE and therefore that their negation would be derived. But this claim is
only correct insofar as we ignore the weaker alternatives ♦∃xPx and ♦∃xQx. Admitting the latter
alternatives makes the former non-IE.
Nouwen’s more general claim is that implicature-based analyses of Free Choice rely on dis-
tribution over disjunction as a necessary condition for deriving FC: If φ(a∨b)⇔ φ(a)∨φ(b) FC
might follow under those approaches, namely we can derive φ(a)∧φ(b), but not otherwise. This
point applies to universal FC too, since distribution over disjunction doesn’t hold in this case:
∀x♦(Px∨Qx)< (∀x♦Px)∨ (∀x♦Qx). Since our analysis derives universal FC, namely we derive
(∀x♦Px)∧ (∀x♦Qx), it suffices to show that unlike the analyses he discusses ours does not have
distrbution over disjunction as a necessary condition for deriving FC.
For space reasons we have to rely on the reader to verify that generating weaker alternatives and
assuming Innocent Inclusion we can derive FC for the case Nouwen discusses too (i.e., the inference
from ♦∀x(Px∨Qx) to (♦∀xPx)∧ (♦∀xQx)). We intend to pursue this issue in detail in future work.
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since ∀x♦Px and ∀x♦Qx are II. Let us show how this result is achieved.
In order to determine which alternatives are II, we first have to determine which
are IE. The maximal sets of alternatives that can be negated consistently with the
prejacent are in (19a), and their intersection which is the set of IE alternatives is in
(19b). The IE alternatives are then ∀x♦(Px∧Qx) and ∃x♦(Px∧Qx).8
(19) a. Maximal sets of alternatives in Alt(∀x♦(Px∨Qx)) that can be negated
consistently with ∀x♦(Px∨Qx):
(i) {∀x♦Px,∀x♦Qx,∀x♦(Px∧Qx),∃x♦(Px∧Qx)}
(ii) {∀x♦Px,∃x♦Px,∀x♦(Px∧Qx),∃x♦(Px∧Qx)}
(iii) {∀x♦Qx,∃x♦Qx,∀x♦(Px∧Qx),∃x♦(Px∧Qx)}
b. IE(∀x♦(Px∨Qx),Alt(∀x♦(Px∨Qx)))) =⋂ (19a) =
{∀x♦(Px∧Qx),∃x♦(Px∧Qx)}
We can now ask what is II: we should check what are the maximal sets of alternatives
that can be asserted consistently with the prejacent and the negation of all IE alterna-
tives. Namely, what are the maximal sets of alternatives that are consistent with the
truth of the prejacent ∀x♦(Px∨Qx) taken together with the falsity of ∃x♦(Px∧Qx)
(we can ignore the other IE alternative, ∀x♦(Px∧Qx), since its falsity is entailed by
the falsity of ∃x♦(Px∧Qx))? As in the case of unembedded FC disjunction, there is
only one such set since all the non-IE alternatives together are consistent with the
prejacent and the negation of all IE alternatives, as in (20a). Therefore the set of II
alternatives in (20b) contains all the non-IE alternatives.
(20) a. Maximal sets of alternatives in Alt(∀x♦(Px∨Qx)) that can be as-
serted consistently with ∀x♦(Px∨Qx)∧¬∃x♦(Px∧Qx):
(i) {∀x♦(Px∨Qx),∀x♦Px,∀x♦Qx,∃x♦(Px∨Qx),∃x♦Px,∃x♦Qx}
b. II(∀x♦(Px∨Qx),Alt(∀x♦(Px∨Qx)))) =⋂ (20a) =
{∀x♦(Px∨Qx),∀x♦Px,∀x♦Qx,∃x♦(Px∨Qx),∃x♦Px,∃x♦Qx}
As in the case of unembedded FC disjunction, exhaustification here yields a complete
answer: it assigns a truth value to every alternative. Most importantly, the alternatives
∀x♦Px and ∀x♦Qx are members in the set of II alternatives. Applying EXHIE+II
would then assert them and derive the desired universal FC inferences, as in (21).
(21) EXHIE+IIAlt(∀x(♦(Px∨Qx))∀x♦(Px∨Qx)
⇔∀x♦Px∧∀x♦Qx∧¬∃x♦(Px∧Qx)
The results of Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion are represented in figure 3.
8 As in the case of unembedded FC disjunction (see fn. 3), the following derivation of universal FC
does not depend on the exclusion of any of the IE alternatives. In many cases they would not be
relevant and thus would not be negated.
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∀x♦(Px∨Qx) ∀x♦(Px∧Qx)
∀x♦Px
∀x♦Qx∃x♦(Px∨Qx) ∃x♦(Px∧Qx)
∃x♦Px
∃x♦Qx
Figure 3 Results of Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion for universal Free
Choice.
The notion of Innocent Inclusion which applies directly to the set of alternatives is
what is responsible for our derivation of universal FC. If we were to apply Fox’s
(2007) EXHIE recursively in this case, we would only derive the weak inferences
∃x♦Px and ∃x♦Qx, but would fail to derive the stronger ∀x♦Px and ∀x♦Qx.9
9 This is since the set of exhaustified alternatives for the second level of exhaustification is as follows:
(i) Alt(EXHIE(∀x♦(Px∨Qx))) =
{EXHIE(∀x♦(Px∨Qx)) = ∀x♦(Px∨Qx)∧¬∃x♦(Px∧Qx),
EXHIE(∀x♦Px) = ∀x♦Px∧¬∃x♦Qx,
EXHIE(∀x♦Qx) = ∀x♦Qx∧¬∃x♦Px,
EXHIE(∀x♦(Px∧Qx)) = ∀x♦(Px∧Qx),
EXHIE(∃x♦(Px∨Qx)) = ∃x♦(Px∨Qx)∧¬∃x♦(Px∧Qx)∧¬∀x♦(Px∨Qx),
EXHIE(∃x♦Px) = ∃x♦Px∧¬∀x♦Px∧¬∃x♦Qx,
EXHIE(∃x♦Qx) = ∃x♦Qx∧¬∀x♦Qx∧¬∃x♦Px,
EXHIE(∃x♦(Px∧Qx)) = ∃x♦(Px∧Qx)∧¬∀x♦(Px∨Qx)}
The last five alternatives contradict the prejacent and hence can be trivially excluded. The only
non-trivially IE alternatives are EXHIE(∀x♦Px) and EXHIE(∀x♦Qx), the negation of both yields
(∀x♦Px→∃x♦Qx)∧ (∀x♦Qx→∃x♦Px). Taken together with the prejacent, this yields the result of
the second application of EXHIE in (ii):
(ii) ∀x♦(Px∨Qx)∧¬∃x♦(Px∧Qx)∧∃x♦Px∧∃x♦Qx
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Recall the motivation we presented for providing a global account of universal
FC, namely the negative universal FC case in (4). Since the same kind of entailment
relations hold between the alternatives in the negative case (4) and the positive case
(3), the result is parallel as can be seen in (24).
(22) No student is required to solve both problem A and problem B [=(4)]
¬∃x(Px∧Qx)
(23) Alt(¬∃x(Px∧Qx)) =
{¬∃x(Px∧Qx),¬∃xPx,¬∃xQx,¬∃x(Px∨Qx),
¬∀x(Px∧Qx),¬∀xPx,¬∀xQx,¬∀x(Px∨Qx)}
(24) EXHIE+IIAlt(¬∃x((Px∧Qx))¬∃x(Px∧Qx)
⇔¬∃xPx∧¬∃xQx∧∀x(Px∨Qx)
To summarize, building on Fox’s notion of Innocent Exclusion we have introduced
the notion of Innocent Inclusion. We have suggested a revision of the exhaustivity
operator such that it would not only negate all the IE alternatives but also assert all
the II alternatives. The empirical motivation for Innocent Inclusion came from the
need for a global derivation for universal FC inferences. As a conceptual motivation
we have suggested that EXH should be able to assign a truth value to every alternative
as long as it wouldn’t lead to a contradiction or choosing arbitrarily between the
alternatives.
In the next section we argue that Innocent Inclusion isn’t only motivated by
considerations that come from the covert exhaustivity operator EXH, but by con-
siderations that come from the overt exhaustivity operator only as well. In §3.1 we
suggest a way to incorporate Innocent Inclusion in the semantics of only in order to
maintain the analogy between the overt and the covert exhaustivity operators, and
in §3.2 we motivate this suggestion based on the interaction between only and FC
disjunction discussed in Alxatib (2014).
3 Further motivation for Innocent Inclusion: the presupposition of only
3.1 The connection between EXH and only
EXH was stated originally as a covert analog of only, with the minimal difference
that while only presupposes its prejacent, EXH asserts it (see Fox 2007):
(25) a. EXHIE asserts that its prejacent is true and asserts that all IE alterna-
tives are false.
b. only presupposes that its prejacent is true and asserts that all IE alter-
natives are false.
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When we add Innocent Inclusion into the definition of EXH in (16), one might
wonder whether this analogy is disrupted.
We claim it does not. the minimal difference can still be maintained if we assume
that Innocent Inclusion is at play in the case of only too: What only presupposes is
the positive part of the meaning EXH asserts, namely Inclusion. The analogy can
then be stated as in (26): while only presupposes all the II alternatives, EXH asserts
them.
(26) a. EXHIE+II asserts that all II alternatives are true and asserts that all IE
alternatives are false.
b. only presupposes that all II alternatives are true and asserts that all
IE alternatives are false.
We propose the lexical entry for only in (28), which following (26) is only differ-
ent from the entry for EXHIE+II in presupposing rather than asserting that all II
alternatives are true.
(27) JEXHIE+IIK(C)(p) = λw.∀r ∈ II(p,C)[r(w)] [= (16)]
∧∀q ∈ IE(p,C)[¬q(w)]
(28) JonlyK(C)(p) = λw : ∀r ∈ II(p,C)[r(w)].
∀q ∈ IE(p,C)[¬q(w)]
3.2 Motivation for Innocent Inclusion with only: Alxatib (2014)
An empirical motivation for the entry we suggested in (28) comes from work by
Alxatib (2014) on the interaction between FC disjunction and only. Embedding FC
disjunction in the scope of only, as in (29), yields the FC inferences in (29a)-(29b).
(29) We are only allowed to eat [ice cream or cake]F .
a.  We are allowed to eat ice cream.
b.  We are allowed to eat cake.
Furthermore, Alxatib (2014) claims that FC inferences become presuppositions
when FC disjunction is embedded in the scope of only. As (30) shows, they project
out of questions, as we would expect from presuppositions. The contrast between
(30) and (31) shows that only is the culprit: in the absence of only, as in (31), we do
not infer FC.10
10 We do not claim that (31) has nothing to do with FC, but rather that FC is not a presupposition. As
Chris Barker pointed out to us, a yes answer to (31) could lead (in certain contexts) to the inference
that we are free to choose between ice cream and cake, and a no answer would naturally convey that
we are allowed neither ice cream nor cake. We set aside the question of how this is derived for now.
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(30) Are we only allowed to eat [ice cream or cake]F?
a.  We are allowed to eat ice cream.
b.  We are allowed to eat cake.
(31) Are we allowed to eat ice cream or cake?
a. 6 We are allowed to eat ice cream.
b. 6 We are allowed to eat cake.
Given the entry for only in (28), the FC inferences in (29) and (30) are straight-
forwardly predicted to be part of the presupposition triggered by only. Since only
presupposes all the II alternatives, applying only to FC disjunction ♦(a∨b) and its
set of alternatives Alt(♦(a∨b)) would presuppose ♦a and ♦b, which are II as has
been established in §2.
However, it is not otherwise trivial to explain why the FC inferences of FC
disjunction under only should become presuppositions.11
4 Distinguishing FC inferences from other scalar implicatures
In previous sections we have shown that the distinction between the notion of
Innocent Exclusion and the notion of Innocent Inclusion proved fruitful for deriving
universal FC inferences and for explaining the interaction between only and FC
disjunction. This section is devoted to point to another potential gain we can get from
this distinction, which is that it provides a natural way to distinguish FC inferences
from other scalar implicatures.
Several authors have questioned the idea that FC inferences are Scalar Implica-
tures (SIs). The main reasons in our opinion are the following:
(32) a. SI computation is costly while FC computation is not.
(e.g., Chemla & Bott 2014)
b. Universal FC inferences are more robust than parallel universal SIs.
(e.g., Chemla 2009b)
On the face of it, (32) seems to be at odds with accounts such as our own in which
FC inferences are SIs. In order to make sense of this discrepancy, we conjecture that
the distinction between FC inferences and other SIs pertains to whether or not they
are obligatory.
(33) Conjecture: FC inferences are obligatory SIs; other SIs are optional.12
11 Alxatib suggests two possible accounts, both relying on the assumption that there is an embedded
exhaustivity operator other than only. However, it is not clear why this exhaustivity operator should
be obligatorily embedded. And without this assumption, the difficulty to cancel the presupposed FC
inferences he points out is not predicted any more.
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To be more precise, we suggest that FC inferences are derived with no need to appeal
to contextual factors, while the derivation of other SIs is dependent on such factors.
If our conjecture is on the right track, we have a way of addressing the problems
in (32). The cost of computation in the case of other SIs comes from the need
to determine the makeup of the context; since the derivation of FC inferences is
independent of contextual properties, the computation is not costly. And since
universal FC can be derived globally (and locally), we also expect it to be obligatory
and thus to be much more robust than other universal SIs.
On what basis can we distinguish FC from other SIs, such that FC inferences
would become obligatory and other SIs wouldn’t? If both FC inferences and other
SIs are derived by Innocent Exclusion, as in Fox (2007), such a difference would
not be expected. But given our proposal, the two kinds of inferences are derived by
different procedures: FC inferences are derived with Innocent Inclusion and other
SIs are derived with Innocent Exclusion. We are then provided with the tools to
explain differences between FC inferences and other SIs, and our conjecture can be
restated in more general terms as in (34):
(34) Generalized conjecture: Inclusion is obligatory; Exclusion is optional.
Independent evidence for (34) comes from phenomena which have been argued to
involve obligatory implicatures, such as Bowler (2014) on Warlpiri manu, Bar-Lev &
Margulis (2014) on Hebrew kol, Meyer (2016) on English or else, Bassi & Bar-Lev
(2016) on Homogeneity with bare conditionals. In all those cases, the alternatives
leading to the obligatory implicatures are, in our terms, II.13
In order to ensure (34), we assume that an alternative can be pruned (ignored)
only if it is IE. Following Katzir (2014: attributed to Emmanuel Chemla and Ben-
12 It may seem that FC inferences can be cancelled as in (i), which would disprove (33):
(i) We are allowed to have ice cream or cake, but I don’t know which.
However, (i) (and all cases where FC is absent) can be argued to involve wide scope disjunction.
In fact, the conditions on ellipsis (sluicing) require this assumption. And a wide scope disjunction
construal is not expected to give rise to FC to begin with. So we can still maintain that (33) holds:
whenever FC is possible, it is obligatory.
Wide scope disjunction sentences sometimes do give rise to FC, for example with you may eat
cake or you may eat ice cream, but not always, for example in you either may eat cake or ice cream
(see Zimmermann 2000; Simons 2005; Alonso-Ovalle 2005; Fox 2007; Klinedinst 2007). See Meyer
& Sauerland (2016) for a recent proposal.
13 It is also possible to interpret the facts about children’s conjunctive interpretation of disjunction from
Singh et al. (2016) along the same lines, assuming that children who didn’t generate a conjunctive
reading were tested at a different developmental stage than those who did. There are facts reported in
the literature that might turn out to provide counter arguments, e.g., Deal (2011) on the Nez Perce
modal affix o’qa and Davidson (2013) on coordination in ASL. We leave this issue for future research.
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jamin Spector, p.c.), we understand pruning as letting EXH negate all relevant IE
alternatives. As a result, if an alternative is irrelevant it is effectively ‘pruned’, i.e.,
not negated by EXH. But pruning doesn’t affect the original set of alternatives: the IE
set (and the II set) is solely defined with respect to the complete set of alternatives.
The definition of EXHIE+II in (35) implements these ideas. EXHIE+II negates
the relevant IE alternatives, namely they are prunable; and asserts the II alternatives
regardless of relevance, making them effectively unprunable. Together with the
auxiliary assumption that EXH application is obligatory (Magri 2009) at matrix
position, II alternatives would be obligatorily included but IE alternatives would be
optionally excluded.
(35) JEXHIE+IIK(C)(p)(w)⇔∀q ∈ IE(p,C)∩R[¬q(w)]
∧∀r ∈ II(p,C)[r(w)]
(where R is the set of contextually relevant alternatives)
5 Summary
Chemla (2009b) has argued that an implicature-based account of FC requires a
global derivation for universal FC in order to cover the negative universal FC case in
(4) for which a local derivation is unavailable.
In order to provide such an account we introduced the notion of Innocent Inclu-
sion, which is built upon Fox’s (2007) notion of Innocent Exclusion. We proposed
a modification of Fox’s (2007) exhaustivity operator, EXHIE+II , which implements
both Innocent Exclusion and Innocent Inclusion: it asserts all the II alternatives and
negates all the IE alternatives. We have shown that EXHIE+II can derive universal
FC inferences globally, thereby solving the universal FC puzzle. As a conceptual
motivation for EXHIE+II we suggested the idea that EXH should be able to give
a complete answer to the question the set of alternatives gives rise to whenever
possible.
Independent evidence for Innocent Inclusion came from the way only interacts
with FC disjunction (Alxatib 2014), which motivated a lexical entry for only in which
it presupposes all the II alternatives. Finally, we utilized the distinction between
Innocent Inclusion and Innocent Exclusion to explain the observed differences
between FC inferences and other SIs: while inferences derived from including II
alternatives (FC) are obligatory, those derived from excluding IE alternatives (other
SIs) are not.
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